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ARTICLE ESSAY 
RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY: THE CASE OF 
FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT 
Carl Tobias* 
Respect for diversity was one quality many faculty members con-
sidered significant when searching in 1987 for a new dean of the 
University of Michigan School of Law.I Yet other so-called elite law 
schools and less prestigious institutions recently have evinced little 
concern for diversity and even indifference toward the idea. Tenure 
and appointment disputes at several Ivy League schools have 
sparked heated controversy and call into question their institutional 
commitments to diversity. Those disputes have involved the legiti-
macy of work by women in legal theory and feminist legal thought, 
although considerable contentious activity also seems to reflect a 
general lack of respect for diversity. The controversies now appear 
to be increasing in number and intensity, while they particularly 
threaten what progress has been made in securing women's full par-
ticipation in the legal academy. It is important, therefore, to discuss 
the disputes candidly and to search for solutions to the problems 
raised. 2 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Marina Angel, Bari Burke, 
Jay Feinman, Marc Feldman, Tom Huff, Michael Libonati, Bill Luneburg, John Orth, 
Michael Risinger, Peggy Sanner, and Marianne Smythe for, valuable suggestions, to the 
Harris Trust and the Cowley Endowment for generous, continuing support, and to 
Brenda Smith for typing this piece. Errors that remain are mine alone. 
I. "Finding" a New Dean, 32 LAw QUADRANGLE NOTES, No. I at 2 (1987). Respect 
for diversity has not always been voiced at Michigan, and the strength of that 
institution's actual commitment to diversity remains unclear. Indeed, a survey compiled 
in the 1986-87 academic year showed that of thirty-nine tenured positions at Michigan, 
one was held by a woman. Moss, Would This Happen to a Man?, A.B.A. J., June 1988, at 
50, 53. For that survey which includes much valuable data on tenure decisions affecting 
women and minorities, see Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on 
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988). Michigan, however,recently 
offered a tenured professorship to Catherine MacKinnon. Lewin, job Offer to Feminist 
Scholar l\Iay Mark Tum, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1989, at B5, col. 3. 
2. For a recent study of women and tenure in law schools, that draws upon 
literature which relates in numerous ways to the issues addressed in this piece, see 
Angel, Women in Legal Education: Whal It's Like To Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the 
Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 799 ( 1988). When that literature is 
particularly applicable, reference will be made to it, although extensive citation is not 
warranted in the essay format employed. For a recent collection of numerous articles 
which treat many issues relating to women and legal education and that clearly illustrate 
the value of having diverse perspectives on scholarship and teaching, see Women in Legal 
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For some time, it has been recognized that law school faculty have 
diverse and potentially conflicting responsibilities. 3 They teach in 
institutions which are neither completely within nor totally outside 
the mission and spirit of the university as a whole. Legal academi-
cians are expected to pursue ostensibly intellectual, theoretical en-
deavors, especially in their scholarship. Faculty members are 
required to do so, even as they must inculcate professional norms 
and impart technical skills in students as preparation for practice in 
a profession which numerous academicians disdain, others have re-
jected, and some have never experienced. 
The law itself has become more difficult to comprehend. For in-
stance, it is decreasingly clear that law is a discipline distinct from 
other areas of inquiry, that law and politics are separate phenomena, 
that the substance of law can be divorced from its procedural as-
pects, or that "contracts" and "torts" denominate discrete fields. 4 
Gone are the halcyon days when, for example, widespread agree-
ment existed that law was a discipline with fixed, ascertainable 
boundaries or that law could be neatly compartmentalized into 
clearly definable substantive areas. 
Indeed, the present seems to be a period of much more uncer-
tainty and indeterminacy than formerly; the very question of what 
law is, is being vigorously debated.5 The phenomena mentioned 
above may only be temporary, although they have been apparent for 
a number of years. The solutions which were adequate in an earlier 
age no longer will suffice; with the expansion of knowledge, consen-
sus may well become more difficult to achieve. In short, legal acade-
micians are uncertain about precisely what it means to teach, write 
about, and practice law and what law is and should be in a complex, 
Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, 1-193 (1988). Cf 
Zenoff and Lorio, What Jl'e Know, What We Think Jl'e Know, and What We Don't Know About 
Women Law Professors, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 869 ( 1983) (earlier study of women faculty in law 
schools). 
3. For a cogent exposition of the ideas in this paragraph, see Bergin, The Law 
Teacher: A /I-Ian Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637 (1968). 
4. The Law and Society Association and its journal, LAW AND SocIETY REVIEW, 
illustrate the first point. The inseparability of law and politics is a central tenet of critical 
legal studies. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQ.UE (D. Kairys ed. 
1982). For recent treatment of substance and procedure, see Burbank, The Costs of 
Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987). One classic on contracts and 
torts is G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT ( 1974). For a recent analysis, see 
Feinman, The jurisprudence of Doctrinal Classification: Contract and Tort As a Case Study With 
Special Reference to Product-Related Economic Loss, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989). 
5. For a more general exposition of the themes in this paragraph, see Saul Bell<;>w, 
Foreword to A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION 
HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS at 11 
(1987). 
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modern society as well as unclear about their own roles and those of 
law schools vis-a-vis the rest of the university, the profession and 
society. 
Law schools may be experiencing a period of intellectual confu-
sion similar to that which confronted the French Academy painters 
more than a century ago.6 Those traditional artists, threatened with 
the prospect of losing their hegemony, rejected the work of Manet 
and the Impressionists, painters who eventually transformed the 
very definition of art. Some law schools have treated similarly ef-
forts of women working principally in the fields of legal theory and 
feminist jurisprudence to be accepted as full-fledged members of 
their academic communities. 
These institutions have rejected (discouraged or granted with 
great reluctance) tenure and teaching applications of women who 
have produced outstanding theoretical and practical work.7 For in-
stance, burgeoning feminist scholarship and some of the candidates' 
endeavors in particular have contributed significantly to the amelio-
ration of two ubiquitous societal practices that degrade women the 
most: wife battering and sexual harassment, especially in the work-
place. 8 The rejection of these applicants has had harmful ramifica-
tions beyond the obvious detrimental impacts on the individuals. 
Students have been deprived of professors who challenge them, 
who are experts in substantive fields important to the students, and 
who are valuable mentors. Specific faculties and the law teaching 
profession have lost the intellectual stimulation, the collegiality, and 
the diverse viewpoints the candidates would have offered. The ad-
verse employment decisions also have significant implications for 
the particular institutions, making them more limited, less dynamic 
and even anti-intellectual. One recent hiring dispute was character-
ized as a battle for the school's soul in which those who narrowly 
succeeded in securing appointment of a prominent feminist scholar 
were said to doubt the value of their victory because the fight had 
been so divisive.9 
6. This is a necessarily truncated account. For thorough treatment, see J. CANADAY, 
MAINSTREAMS OF MODERN ART chs. 14-15 (2d ed. 1981). 
7. "Rejection" will be used as shorthand for the two possibilities mentioned in the 
parenthetical. Twenty percent of American law schools are making less progress than 
others and prestigious schools comprise a significant number of these institutions. 
Chused, supra note I, at 539, 548. 
8. The classic example is c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX D1scRJMINATJON (1979). For more general discussion of these 
efforts and the amelioration effected, see Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives From the Womens Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642-48 (1986). 
9. Adams, A Baille for Yale Law School's Soul, Nat'I LJ., Feb. 15, 1988, at 3, col. I. 
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The ways these tenure and appointment determinations appear to 
have been made are particularly troubling in that the women re-
jected seemed to meet the requirements as clearly as men. An im-
portant complication is that some decisions apparently have been 
premised on the political perspectives of the applicants. One wo-
man's tenure request was refused even though "all parties seem to 
agree [she had] impeccable credentials," having published a path-
breaking article in a law review widely acknowledged to be the na-
tion's second best and having had a book scheduled for publication 
by Oxford University Press, perhaps the most prestigious such pub-
lisher; she claimed that "they don't want women who threaten the 
status quo too much." 10 
Application of the criteria employed in reaching the determina-
tions also appears especially problematic. Significant difficulties are 
that the criteria themselves are facially so demanding or can be ap-
plied so rigidly that they are virtually impossible to meet (of course, 
few of the already tenured faculty applying the standards could sat-
isfy them). 
An individual recently denied tenure received glowing praise 
from many national and international luminaries in her field, includ-
ing Jacques Derrida, a preeminent French philosopher. Although 
the applicant was only an assistant professor, she was said to have 
written more than any member of the faculty at the same career 
stage, publishing some fifteen pieces in numerous respected 
journals. 11 
Correspondingly, the criteria can be applied in ways that seem 
technical. For example, although elite and aspiring law schools have 
accorded less value to scholarship that is doctrinal or practical while 
theoretical work has enjoyed a special cachet, the theory which is 
prized has had to fit within a narrow band on the theoretical spec-
trum. Thus, several women whose candidacies were in dispute dis-
covered or developed new substantive areas, created or 
reformulated the terms of legal discourse, or imaginatively explored 
or articulated novel ways of understanding law or of resolving legal 
controversies. 12 Nevertheless, their contributions proved too much 
and too little; they were deemed both overly theoretical and uncon-
I 0. Down a11d Out i11 Cambridge, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1988, at 66. The law review article 
was Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstrnction of Co11trac/ Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985). 
11. Moss, supra note I, at 50. She is negotiating conditions for reconsideration of 
the tenure denial and another school "overwhelmingly voted" to offer her tenure. 
Markoff, Tenure Offered, Nat'I L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 4, col. 3. 
12. Professor MacKinnon's seminal work on sexual harassment is a helpful example. 
c. MACKINNON, supra note 8. 
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ventional. Indeed, considerable debate involving these individuals' 
candidacies apparently centered on whether the substance of their 
work was legitimate, whether the analytical techniques they used 
were appropriate in the legal academy, whether their endeavors 
constituted law, and the meaning of law and legal scholarship. 
Many of these problems are epitomized by the observations of 
two male faculty members in a recent hiring dispute and by the ad-
vice deans of two elite schools gave women faculty. The first profes-
sor allegedly asserted that appointment of someone " 'whose forte 
is extremist, mystical polemics and who rejects both legal method 
and scholarship as 'male dominated,' hence invalid, would be a be-
trayal of our essence' - which he defined as 'responsible scholar-
ship.' " 13 The other reportedly stated that, were the applicant 
hired, the school "could rapidly become a theater of ideological 
warfare, as well as an insufficiently supervised playground of the 
mind in which we lose our capacity to resist the charms of superficial 
and passing intellectual fads." 14 The deans were said to have ad-
vised female faculty that work in the areas of feminist legal theory or 
gender discrimination simply was not worthwhile. 15 
Of course, these techniques of rejection are venerable, enjoying 
pedigrees that substantially predate the Academy painters. For in-
stance, by delineating as appropriate particular areas for substantive 
inquiry and as proper methodologies for addressing them and by 
prescribing as acceptable certain modes of discourse, it is possible at 
once to disparage specific fields of endeavor and analytical tech-
niques and to discredit those who work in the areas. 16 
Allegations of some that the rejection of these women reflects se-
xism cannot be proved. It is difficult to imagine, however, that very 
many legal academicians would seriously contend that the seminal 
substantive work and novel approaches to law of James Boyd White 
or Milner Ball are ill-suited to law schools or that they should depart 
13. Adams, supra note 9, at 8, cols. 3-4. 
14. Id. at 8, col. 3. 
15. See Moss, supra note 1, at 52; Adams, supra note 9, at 8, col. 2. One of the deans 
stated that he could not "conceive of saying anything of the sort." Adams, supra note 9, 
at 8, col. 2. There are indications that some untenured women faculty are being advised 
not to produce scholarship in areas such as feminist legal thought, lest their tenure 
opportunities be threatened. Wald, Women in the Law, 24 TRIAL 75, 77 (November 
1988); Carter, Women Face Hurdles as Professors, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 24, 1988, at l, col. l, 31, 
col. 2. 
16. Ridicule is another classic technique. In the hiring dispute mentioned above, 
one of the male professors opposed to appointment allegedly circulated a memorandum 
entitled "Feminism Unhinged," an obvious attempt to denigrate both Professor 
MacKinnon and her recent, well-received book entitled FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). See Adams, supra note 9, at 8, col. 3. 
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the academy (treatment suggested as appropriate for Critical Legal 
scholars by a former dean of one elite school) .17 Nevertheless, the 
contributions of Professors White and Ball are no more demonstra-
bly "legal" or concrete than the work of the women at the center of 
these disputes. Moreover, most of the women appear to have met 
the relevant criteria as clearly as numerous men whose applications 
were contemporaneously granted without controversy. 18 Given the 
pervasive, complex and subtle nature of sexism in American society 
and the very recent entry of women in substantial numbers to law 
schools and the profession, it would be surprising if sexism were 
absent from law schools and from these tenure and appointment 
decisions. 19 
In light of the current intellectual state of the law and the present 
circumstances of legal academia-marked by uncertainty, indetermi-
nacy, and ferment-greater, rather than less, respect for diversity is 
warranted. What has happened in law schools, however, constitutes 
movement in the wrong direction. Preferable approaches are to be 
as inclusive as possible and receptive to the widest practicable sub-
stantive inquiry. For example, law schools should foster in their 
communities enhanced appreciation and expanded application of 
knowledge developed in non-legal disciplines or derived from sys-
tems of law other than Anglo-American ones while increasing the 
17. A recent example of Professor White's work is HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE 
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW ( 1985). A recent example of Professor Ball's work is 
LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAw, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985). For the suggestion as 
to Critical Legal scholars, see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 
226-27 (1984). 
18. For example, the woman, mentioned supra text accompanying note 10, claimed 
"her record was equal to or better than that of seven men voted tenure during the 1986-
1987 school year." Moss, supra note I, at 50. Two tenured faculty members stated that 
the woman, mentioned supra text accompanying note 11, may have been denied tenure 
based in part on gender discrimination. Moss, supra note I, at 50. Moreover, this thesis 
is implicit throughout Professor Angel's study of tenure decisions involving women at 
five law schools. Angel, supra note 2. Indeed, Drucilla Ramey, executive director and 
general counsel of the Bar Association of Sar. Francisco, testified before the ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession that tenure of women faculty is a "national 
disgrace." "Ms. Ramey testified that 'it is an absolute open secret among every single 
woman who teaches ... in law school today that, in fact, the ordinary schlemiel from 
these elite law schools who got some clerkship is going to get tenure without too much 
trouble in our most distinguished schools, whereas women are scrutinized under a 
microscope and are generally found to be fatally flawed in one way or another." Carter, 
supra note 15, at 31. 
19. For data on women's entry into law schools and on tenure decisions involving 
women, see Angel, supra note 2. Cf Chused, supra note I, at 548-52 (more data on 
tenure decisions). For a recent study of gender differences in the law school and 
professional experiences of students and graduates of one law school, see Gender, Legal 
Education, and the legal Profession: 1ln Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (1988). 
1989] FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT 181 
number of faculty who work in non-traditional fields, such as femi-
nist legal thought. 
I am not contending that henceforth all scholarship be replete 
with references to Continental philosophers or that social scientists 
be de rigueur on every law school faculty. I am not advocating diver-
sity for diversity's sake or suggesting that standards be jettisoned in 
pursuit of diversity.20 I also am not predicting that those working in 
the area of feminist legal thought will be the next Impressionists or 
even the new Legal Realists. Nevertheless, they have offered strik-
ingly new insights to date and promise to make even greater contri-
butions in the future, especially in fields of compelling importance 
to women and society. 21 
I am arguing that women should not be held to more demanding 
requirements than men. I urge as well the development and appli-
cation of criteria which admit of varied theoretical and political per-
spectives and analytical techniques, although I appreciate that 
crafting and employing such standards may be· difficult. For exam-
ple, when judging contributions in areas as complex and controver-
sial as gender issues, the criteria should be whether the work 
stimulates constructive thinking or fosters new ways of analyzing the 
issues rather than whether it resolves the questions, galvanizes con-
sensus, or ultimately persuades the reader.22 Correspondingly, 
writing in the area of feminist legal theory would be equally valuable 
as that in tax or constitutional law, while drafting an ordinance that 
seeks to limit pornography because it discriminates against women 
would constitute public service as important as writing a Securities 
20. I realize that respect for diversity can cover a multitude of sins and that beyond a 
certain-or more likely, uncertain-point, diversity alone will not be enough. 
21. See, e.g., Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. I, 15 (1987) (women's 
movement seems to be on the verge of mobilizing an entire generation of law students). 
For an example of their efforts which have helped to ameliorate wife battering and 
sexual harassment, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. Much work remains to be 
done in those areas and numerous others-such as sexism, gender discrimination in 
employment, pregnancy policies, and child care-before women will be full participants 
in law schools, the legal profession, and society. For valuable recent work on these 
issues, see C. MACKINNON, supra note 16; Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of 
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Littleton, 
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); West, jurisprudence and 
Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. I (1988); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 
(1989). 
22. The standards listed at the end of the sentence in the text simply are unrealistic 
and too demanding in areas as unsettled and potentially explosive as gender issues 
involving delicate, threatening questions of male/female personal and political power. 
For discussion of such power, see C. MACKINNON, supra note 8; Olsen, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 ( 1983). For analysis of 
new understandings of gender relations in professional settings, see Rhode, Perspectives 
011 Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. l 163 (1988). 
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and Exchange Commission regulation or revising a state probate 
code.23 There is ample room in law school communities for tradi-
tional legal scholarship, Critical Legal Studies, law and economics, 
and feminist legal thought as well as much more. 
This is a call for recognition that pluralism and diversity are 
healthy and a plea for the broadest feasible endeavor consistent with 
the multi-faceted missions of law schools. 24 Restrictions may be im-
posed by resource constraints or by felt obligations of law schools to 
their varied constituencies. Most potential difficulties likely to be 
encountered have not been considered, much less tested, and it now 
appears that few will prove intractable.25 The approaches suggested 
promise to increase the number of members of the academic com-
munity who are included in the intellectual enterprise and to enable 
women to become full participants in legal education. They also 
should make law schools more stimulating and humane institutions 
while enriching the continuing quest for a clearer under~~anding of 
law as we enter the last decade of the twentieth century.26 
23. The suggestions in the text are intended to be just that, suggestive. Others can 
be offered and should be developed and applied. For instance, faculty who find that the 
Socratic method impedes learning and who experiment with alternative teaching 
techniques should not be penalized (and probably should be rewarded) for those 
choices when their teaching is evaluated for tenure purposes. For criticism of the 
Socratic method and discussion of alternatives, see Moss, supra note 1, at 54-55. For 
additional helpful suggestions, see Angel, supra note 2, at 832-36. 
24. At the January 1989 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS), 300 law faculty called for the appointment of an independent commission to 
study diversity in law school faculties. Petition to the AALS House of Representatives 
(Dec. 21, 1988) (on file with University of Cincinnati Law Review). Cf Wald, supra note 
15, at 77 ( "Law schools have much introspection and outreaching to do-quickly" if the 
legal "profession is serious about bringing women into the mainstream with full rights 
and benefits."). 
25. Indeed, the University of Wisconsin Law School simultaneously extended offers 
to four minority law professors last year. Markoff, Wisconsin Does the Impossible; Boosts 
JHinority Ranks by Four, Nat'l LJ., March 6, 1989, at 4, col. I. Cf letter from Professor 
Richard Wydick, Chair, Faculty Appointments Committee, University of California 
Davis, School of Law, to Carl Tobias (March 27, 1989) (consistent with school's desire to 
diversify the law faculty, University of California Davis recently extended offers to three 
people, one of whom was black and two of whom were Mexican-American). 
26. In April, 1989, Professor Herma Hill Kay, President of AALS, strongly called for 
law schools to promote diversity. She recommended that the AALS "generate its own 
data on faculty recruitment and retention practices" and that there be "a true 
acceptance of the differences in background, experience, talent, and intellectual taste 
that are represented by the concept of 'diversity' [that] will enable all of us to hear and 
value the many voices of modern legal education." She added that the "reward for all of 
us, if we are successful, will lie in the intellectual richness that diversity confers upon our 
joint enterprise." AALS Newsletter No. 89-2, 1-3 (April 1989). For recent work 
exploring conditions that would be hospitable to diversity in legal scholarship, see 
Dalton, The Faithful Liberal and the Question of Diversity, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1989). 
